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Abstract 
Background 
A ‘blame culture’ in health care organisations constitutes a threat to the prevention of 
medication incidents resulting in deaths and injuries. The problem of human fallibility 
can be addressed through two different approaches to error management: the person 
approach and the system approach. This study tests the reliability and construct 
validity of the recently adjusted blame culture questionnaire and examines the 
relationship between the person and system approaches and blame culture in health 
care organisations.  
Research question 
What is the relationship between the two approaches to the problem of human 
fallibility (i.e. person approach and system approach) and blame culture in health care 
organisations?  
Method 
Ninety-seven health care employees completed the Medication Safety Culture 
Questionnaire (MSCQ). The psychometric quality of the questionnaire was measured 
with a reliability analysis and a confirmatory factor analysis. A simple regression 
analysis was executed to measure the presence of a link between the person and 
system approaches and blame culture.  
Results 
Although the reliability of the blame culture questionnaire was considered good, it 
was not constructually valid, even after moving and deleting items. Based on this 
data, there was a significant, positive relation between the person and system 
approaches and blame culture. About half of the variance of blame culture was 
explained by the person/system scale. People who experienced a person approach 
reported significantly more fear than those who experienced a system approach.  
Conclusion  
The current blame culture questionnaire is not yet complete. The person and system 
approaches have a significant influence on the fear/trust aspect of blame culture. More 
research into the theoretical aspects of blame culture is needed to improve the 
questionnaire. Further research should also focus on the effect of importing 
characteristics of high-reliability organisations into the medical domain. This can 
contribute to the prevention of medication incidents and thereby improve patient 
safety.  
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Introduction 
 
 The need to organise health care in an effective manner is becoming 
increasingly important in aiming for patient safety (Ramanujam & Rousseau, 2006). 
A ‘blame culture’ in health care is considered a major factor for an excessively high 
number of medical errors, including medication incidents (Khatri, Brown & Hicks, 
2009). A ‘just culture’, on the other hand, fosters a supportive work environment in 
which members believe that they can criticise the activities carried out, talk openly 
about worries and admit mistakes without fear of punishment (Tucker, Nembhard & 
Edmondson, 2007). This culture has emerged as a necessity for improving the quality 
of care, and thereby patient safety (Pronovost et al., 2003). However, the role of a 
safety culture in the prevention of medication incidents in health care organisations 
has so far been underexposed, as little research has focused on the effect of cultural 
factors on medical errors and the quality of health care.  
Many hospitalisations have resulted from the side effects of medication, and 
almost half of them could have been prevented (Leendertse et al., 2008). The main 
objective of this study is to enhance patient safety among health care organisations in 
which medication is prescribed, administered and/or monitored. This is achieved by 
answering the following research question: What is the relationship between the two 
approaches to the problem of human fallibility (i.e. person approach and system 
approach) and blame culture in health care organisations with health care employees 
who prescribe, administer and/or monitor medication? Each approach has its own 
method of error management (Reason, 2000). In order to fully understand all of this, 
the theoretical background with regard to human error and blame culture is discussed 
in more detail later in this report.  
The first section explains the theories related to the subject matter, including 
safety culture, human error, organisational learning and error management. This 
section concludes with the resulting hypotheses. The first part of the method section 
describes the statistical analyses undertaken to achieve the desired results. The second 
part specifies the study’s target population. The results section presents the research 
findings. The fourth section answers the question of whether there is a link between 
the person and system approaches and blame culture. This section highlights the 
limitations of the research and ends with a conclusion that summarises the main 
findings and offers recommendations for further research.   
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1 Theoretical background 
 
1.1 Medication incidents in the Netherlands 
Medication incidents can cause serious side effects that could even result in 
hospitalisation. The research of Leendertse et al. (2008) has indicated that 5.6% of 
hospital admissions in the Netherlands is due to medication incidents. Each year, 
thousands of people are hospitalised because of medication incidents. Approximately 
2,500 of these admissions result in death or serious injury, of which nearly half 
(46.5%) could have been prevented. It can thus be concluded that unintended patient 
harm is often caused by medication, more specifically by either side effects of 
medication use or by medication incidents. Medication incidents deliver millions of 
unnecessary costs that must be paid by medical insurance. Currently, no information 
is available concerning medication incidents by general practitioners and nursing 
home physicians. Many medication incidents occur unnecessarily and have a 
recurrent pattern because health care employees rarely report errors, and thereby 
barely learn from them (Gotzsche, 2013). In view of this, it is important that 
medication incidents are reported and discussed openly to improve patient safety. 
High-quality health care systems assign high priority to this (Pronovost et al., 2003). 
Incident reporting is important to avoid similar problems in the future. 
Hospitals still infrequently report medication incidents even though this is easily 
accessible and can be done anonymously through the central medication incidents 
registration (CMR) system. In the Netherlands, the nationwide CMR system was 
developed for the use in hospitals in 2006 and adapted for additional settings in 2010 
(Cheung, Van Den Bemt, Bouvy, Wensing & De Smet, 2011). Research by Cheung et 
al. (2011) has indicated that, in a period of four years, very few hospitals have 
reported more than hundred medication incidents, namely 14% of 90 hospitals in the 
Netherlands (i.e. 96.8% of the 93-total number of hospitals in the Netherlands), and 
74% has not reported a single incident. Hospitals and community pharmacies report 
different types of medication incidents. The reports of hospitals are often related to 
the administration of medication (39%). The reports of community pharmacies often 
concern medication incidents that occur during prescribing and/or monitoring 
medication (43%). In this research, consideration is therefore given to health care 
employees who prescribe, administer and/or monitor medication.  
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There are several factors predicting preventable medication-related hospital 
admissions. The main determinants are deteriorated cognition, many medical 
diseases, poor living conditions, renal impairment, a high number of previous 
hospitalisations and the usage of several medicines at the same time (Leendertse et al., 
2008). Reporting incidents can help health care providers learn from incidents and 
improve patient safety (Corrigan, Donaldson, Kohn et al., 2000). Thus, a proper 
system for reporting medication incidents is crucial (Leape, 2002). Well-functioning 
reporting systems can offer information to other health care organisations about types 
of mistakes, causes, risks, consequences and preventive measures (Montesi & Lechi, 
2009; Dovey & Phillips, 2004; Williams & Ashcroft, 2009). The identified risk 
factors can be used in the prevention of hospitalisations that are caused by medication 
incidents (Leendertse et al., 2008).  
 
1.2 Organisational learning 
 Organisational learning plays a vital role in improving safety (Akselsson, 
Jacobsson, Bötjesson & Enander, 2012), and there are four processes link learning 
from the individual to the organisation. These are intuiting, interpreting, integrating 
and institutionalising, also called the 4I. Figure 1 depicts how learning flows through 
the 4I processes in the form of feedback and feed-forward. The process starts with 
intuiting and interpreting at the individual level. Together with interpreting, 
integrating occurs at the group level. Integrating is the process of ensuring a common 
understanding among people. Integrating and institutionalising occur at the 
organisational level. Institutionalising ensures that routine operations continue to exist 
and is achieved through the process of embedding the learning that arises through 
people within the organisation (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999). 
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Figure 1. Organisational Learning as a Dynamic Process* 
* Excerpted from Crossan, Lane & White (1999) 
 
 Adverse events occur frequently in health care organisations. They negatively 
affect organisational learning and patient safety. Zegers et al. (2009) define an 
adverse event as ‘an unintended jury that results in temporary or permanent 
disability, death or prolonged hospital stay, and is caused by health care management 
rather than by the patient’s underlying disease process’. Although adverse events 
have a negative impact on organisations, they can also considerably contribute to 
improvements to the system. Every adverse event has many serious incidents that 
have a major effect on patient safety as well as many less serious incidents that have 
little or no effect on patient safety. More effective organisational learning from these 
serious and less serious incidents could support improvements in the system that can 
reduce the risk of recurrent adverse events (Cooke, Dunscombe & Lee, 2007). Khatri 
et al. (2009) have argued that a just culture should consist of highly developed 
organisational learning and expect that fewer harmful incidents occur that have an 
adverse effect on patient safety within an organisation, as well as that people are more 
capable of learning from incidents. In other words, from an organisational learning 
perspective, a just culture can be defined as an organisation’s ability to analyse, report 
and investigate incidents and to undertake resolving actions that improve patient 
safety and reduce the risk of further incidents. 
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 Cook et al. (2007) have found that management- and organisational-related 
problems were major obstacles to effective incident learning within an organisation. 
They have also determined that this is a larger barrier than the willingness of the staff 
to report incidents. Furthermore, the research by Cook et al. (2007) has evidenced that 
organisational learning is hindered by a lack of follow-up actions for reported 
incidents. Learning from incidents strongly correlates with safety climate variables, as 
well as with safety-related behaviors and trust. This is particularly the case for trust, 
knowledge with regard to safety, participation in the safety environment and 
compliance with safety rules (Akselsson et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to ensure 
that an organisation is able to make improvements and become safer, it is necessary to 
learn effectively from incidents that occur within that organisation (Drupsteen, 
Groeneweg & Zwetsloot, 2013). Drupsteen, Groeneweg and Zwetsloot (2013) 
illustrate this through their learning from incidents model consisting of four stages: 
investigating and analysing incidents, planning interventions, interventing and 
evaluating. The first stage – investigating and analysing incidents – consists of the 
following steps: incident reporting, incident registration, determining the depth and 
scope of research, fact finding and incident analysis. If a step is not performed well, 
this is a serious obstacle in the learning process, leading to a loss of learning potential.  
 
1.3 Blame culture 
 Firstly, we need to gain a better understanding of how a blame culture arises 
and to define precisely what it is. When a person’s self-image is endangered, he or she 
is strongly motivated to protect a positive self-image. One common way is to blame 
other people for his or her own failures in order to avoid admitting responsibility for 
an unwanted situation (Fast & Tiedens, 2009). This problem worsens when blame 
plays a prominent role in the shared culture of an organisation. Although several 
definitions exist, the working definition used here is that of Khatri et al. (2009), which 
defines a blame culture as ‘a set of norms and attitudes within an organization 
characterized by an unwillingness to take risks or accept responsibility for mistakes 
because of fear of criticism or management admonishment’. Such a culture fosters 
distrust and fear, and people blame each other to avoid being accused themselves. 
This results in a lack of inspiration, joy and creativity because people are terrified to 
make mistakes (Khatri et al., 2009).  
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 There are many potential causes for the emergence of a blame culture. Reason 
(1997) think this is due to the high amount of individual autonomy in Western 
cultures. Western people are accustomed to searching for a victim to blame when an 
incident happens (Reason, 1997). Research by Cresswell et al. (2013) has 
demonstrated that medical education curricula do not familiarise students with patient 
safety theory and, more importantly, students do not receive practical training to 
develop their skills for constructively challenging unsafe practices. Instead, they are 
trained to make no mistakes and perform perfectly. This may seriously enhance the 
fear of taking responsibility for one’s own actions, which in turn encourages a blame 
culture (Mitchell, 2014).  
A prevailing blame culture has devastating consequences for organisations. 
When it is present and incidents occur, the focus is on the person or people who 
caused the incidents instead of on the system that might be unsafe. Hereby, attention 
is diverted from the defects of the system (Kaissi, 2006). This is also referred to as a 
‘person approach’, and is discussed further in the human error section. Another 
negative effect of a prevailing blame culture is that defensive medicine takes place 
more often. Defensive medicine occurs when a health care professional unnecessarily 
prescribes medication or does not perform important procedures in order to avoid a 
risk or damage claims from patients. This phenomenon is directly related to the 
growing threat of medical malpractice in recent years. Defensive medicine increases 
the cost of health care and may present a danger for patients (Catino, 2009). Another 
reason for blame culture’s detrimental impact on organisations is that it can lead to a 
decrease in compassion. In this way, a blame culture could endanger the achievement 
of an open work atmosphere with empathic interactions in organisations (Crawford, 
Brown, Kvangarsnes & Gilbert, 2014). These consequences constitute a serious threat 
to patient safety. 
 
1.4 Just culture 
 An environment that supports openness to facilitate patient safety is often 
referred to as a just culture (Scott-Cawiezell et al., 2006). According to research by 
Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains and Lackan (2010), a just culture recognises errors as 
system failures, rather than individual failures, and does not hold individuals 
responsible for their actions. The following characteristics describe a just culture: full 
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commitment to patient safety, uninhibited reporting and identification of medication 
incidents, quick and detailed research on medication incidents, open communication 
and information sharing, effective learning after the medication incident has occurred, 
training in the field of patient safety and improving the quality of teamwork regarding 
safety (Kirk, Parker, Claridge, Esmail & Marshall, 2007). In a just culture 
environment, health care employees understand that they can talk openly about 
incidents and report them without being afraid of being punished. A just culture 
encourages health care employees to report incidents and truly learn from their 
mistakes. This also helps organisations gain insight into their errors and make 
improvements (Beyea, 2004). Edmonson (2004) has stated that employees being 
uncomfortable about speaking up with questions can compromise the safety of 
patients and render them much more vulnerable. According to Von Thaden, Hoppes, 
Li, Johnson and Schriver (2006), a just culture provides a safe environment in which 
trust is highly regarded. Moreover, it encourages employees for the conveyance of 
important safety-related information and makes a clear distinction between acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour. Just as with a blame culture, a just culture is located 
within the entire safety culture of an organisation (Figure 2).  
 
  
Figure 2. Representation of a just culture as the middle component between patient 
safety and a safety culture*  
* Excerpted from Hoppes, et al. (2005) 
 
1.5 Aspects of blame culture 
On the basis of the literature, it is recognised that blame culture consists of various 
aspects, including: management, openness, speaking up, fairness, fear/trust and 
psychological safety. Blame culture is a major factor in medical reporting and 
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organisational learning, which in turn influences patient safety. It is assumed that 
person and system approaches greatly influence the various aspects of blame culture, 
and thus influence blame culture itself, medical reporting, and so on (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Proposed model of the various aspects underlying blame culture  
 
According to Khatri et al. (2009), there are clearly two ways of management – 
control-based and commitment-based – which result in different practices. The 
control-based approach assumes that people are incapable of self-regulating their 
behaviors, and they need constant guidance from the management. This has an 
adverse effect on the behavior of employees. For example, employees in the control-
based approach follow orders from above and do not like to take any responsibility. 
The control-based approach does not enable learning, and therefore could unleash a 
vicious cycle in which an increasing frequency of medication incidents further 
strengthens the blame culture. The commitment-based approach is instrumental in 
creating a just culture (Khatri et al., 2009).  
 Research by Derickson, Fishman, Osatuke, Teclaw and Ramsel (2015) has 
indicated that psychological safety also fosters learning environments. 
Psychologically safe work environments give employees the feeling that they are free 
to ask questions, make suggestions, identify mistakes or seek feedback. More 
specifically, psychologically safe health care workplaces facilitate the reporting of 
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medication incidents by creating an environment where errors can be corrected 
without fear of the consequences. Gorini, Miglioretti and Pravettoni (2012) have 
stated that the fear of being blamed is assumed to be more damaging than beneficial 
because it evokes feelings of anxiety and constitutes a significant barrier to the 
reporting of medication incidents, which hinders possibilities for improvement.   
 The aforementioned aspects were identified as majorly impacting the 
existence of a blame culture, which in turn influences the reporting of medication 
incidents. The learning from incidents model by Drupsteen et al. (2013) has 
demonstrated that incident reporting is an essential part of organisational learning. 
Drupsteen et al. (2013) have noted that it is necessary to report an incident before it 
can be analysed. They have also asserted that some form of a reporting system is 
required to enable reporting, and that a just culture – or at least a blameless culture – 
should be present (Drupsteen et al., 2013). Waring (2005) has stated that the culture 
of blame constitutes a major barrier to incidents reporting. When the reporting of 
incidents is hindered, learning from mistakes is no longer possible, which has an 
inhibitory effect on patient safety (Khatri et al., 2009). The way in which the human 
error problem is addressed is also strongly linked with blame culture. This is 
discussed further in the next section.     
 
1.6 The person and system approaches  
 There are two ways of addressing the human error problem: blaming the 
person and holding the system accountable. Each has a distinct way of error causation 
and a different idea of error management. These differences in error management 
have important practical implications for contending with the always-present risk of 
errors in health care. Proponents of the person approach focus on the unsafe acts, 
including errors and procedural violations, of the people concerned. These unsafe acts 
are seen as the cause of deviating mental processes, such as forgetfulness, inattention 
and recklessness (McCauley & Berkowitz Lerner, 1970). For example, data from the 
Australian Incident Monitoring Study, which is based upon 2,000 anaesthetic 
incidents, has identified the following as the most commonly contributing factors: 
misjudgement, equipment-related failures, inattention, inexperience, communication 
problems and haste (Cooper, Newbower, Long et al., 1978). Psychological factors, 
such as inattention and recklessness, are hard to predict and control. In contrast, the 
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organisational factors that give rise to them are present before an incident occurs, and 
can therefore be effectively addressed (Reason, 2005). This is discussed further in the 
following sections.   
 Blaming individuals is emotionally more fulfilling than seeking defects in the 
institution. From this point of view, i.e. according to the person approach, people are 
able freely to choose between safe and unsafe acts. If an incident occurs, it is assumed 
that an individual or a group of individuals is responsible. It is vital for the 
management to view an individual’s unsafe acts independently of any organisational 
responsibility. Nevertheless, the person approach has serious weaknesses and is not 
well suited for the medical domain. One such shortcoming is that unsafe acts are 
isolated from their systemic context. For this reason, two key features of human error 
are often disregarded. First, human beings easily make mistakes. Second, mishaps 
often recur. Apart from the people involved, the same circumstances can cause similar 
mistakes. In this way, an approach that does not help to remove error-triggering gaps 
within the system hinders the achievement of greater safety (Reason, 2000).  
Although some unsafe acts arise due to errors made by the people in an 
organisation, approximately 90% of lapses in maintaining planes – also a high-risk 
job – were determined to be unconscious (Marx, 1997). A reporting culture is crucial 
in the pursuit of effective risk management (Reason, 1997). A thorough analysis of 
incidents is necessary to detect recurring errors. Trust is considered the most defining 
aspect of a reporting culture, which itself requires a just culture (Marx, 1999). In view 
of this, developing a just culture is the first step to increasing safety. It seems that this 
must be accompanied by the system approach. An assumption in the system approach 
is that people are made in such a way that they easily make mistakes and, even in the 
best organisations, errors are to be expected. Errors are not considered as causes but 
as consequences (Reason, 2000).  
 
1.7 The Swiss cheese model of system accidents   
The system approach assigns high priority to barriers, defences and 
safeguards, which are present in high-technology systems. High-technology systems 
consist of three types of defensive layers: constructed layers (alarms, physical 
barriers, etc.), people-dependent layers (physicians, pilots, etc.) and defences that rely 
on procedures and administrative controls. These systems attempt to protect victims 
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from potential dangers. They normally succeed, but there are still major 
shortcomings. It would be ideal if each defensive layer would be undamaged; 
however, each layer instead has many holes, like slices of Swiss cheese (Stein & 
Heiss, 2015). Reason (1990) has presumed that these layers can be conceptualised as 
four levels of failure: organisational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for 
unsafe acts and the unsafe acts themselves. The holes are constantly changing places. 
A negative outcome happens when the holes in many layers form an incident 
opportunity, whereby potential dangers come into damaging contact with victims 
(Stein & Heiss, 2015). According to Reason’s Swiss cheese model, organisational 
safety can be improved by designing safeguards that are effective in preventing 
accidents and incidents (Peuscher & Groeneweg, 2012).  
Almost all adverse events may be due to combinations of active failures and 
latent conditions. Active failures are unsafe acts that are often carried out by people 
who come into immediate contact with the system. Active failures directly affect the 
robustness of the defences. There are various distinguishable forms of active failures: 
mistakes, violations, slips and lapses. Mistakes are decision-making failures; they 
arise when a person does something wrong, believing it to be right. Violations are 
intentional failures. Slips and lapses occur with particularly familiar tasks that are 
performed without much conscious attention, e.g. driving. Proponents of the person 
approach often conclude their search for the causes of an adverse event once an 
individual is blamed for the unsafe acts. Latent conditions occur mostly as of 
management decisions. Management has a major impact on the design of a system’s 
safeguards. Latent conditions can contribute to errors within the workplace as a 
consequence of high time pressure, tiredness and incapacity. They can also contribute 
to the occurrence of holes in the defences due to unreliable alarms, design flaws and 
poor-working procedures. An accident opportunity arises easily once latent conditions 
combine with active failures. Active failures are incredibly difficult to anticipate. 
However, latent conditions can be identified and combated before an incident occurs. 
This is referred to as proactive error management (Reason, 2000). 
 
1.8 Error management 
 The person and system approaches have their own method of error 
management. Research into human factors has always aimed to develop managing 
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and resolving errors. It has revealed two ways of managing unsafe acts: preventing 
dangerous errors and mitigating detrimental effects if they have occurred. Those are 
powerful tools, which are characteristic for the system approach. Proponents of the 
person approach, however, strive for management that renders individuals less 
fallible. But as noted earlier, blaming others hinders learning, and performance may 
therefore deteriorate. Most managers in organisations where the person approach is 
the dominant tradition strive to eliminate human fallibility as much as possible. For 
followers of the system approach, it is important to direct their management resources 
at multiple targets: the person, the team, the task, the workplace and the organisation 
(Reason, 2000).  
High-reliability organisations are the main examples of a system approach. In 
high-reliability organisations, it is recognised that humans’ varying responses to 
changing events can be considered one of the system’s most important safeguards 
(Weick, 1987). High-reliability organisations are designed in such a way that they are 
resistant to all possible circumstances. Although high-reliability organisations expect 
and encourage various human responses, they also work tirelessly in striving for an 
attitude of intelligent wariness (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). High-reliability 
organisations distinguish themselves by their main point of view that failure can arise 
anywhere, and at any time. They therefore train their employees to cope with the most 
difficult situations. Furthermore, they are protected from extreme external influences 
and have the resources to contend with potential danger at all levels of the 
organisation. Employees may be less careful, but the culture of a high-reliability 
organisation gives them the tools to help them remember. It is not that these 
organisations are immune to adverse events, but rather they have converted these 
incidents into enhanced defensibility of the system (Reason, 2000).  
 
1.9 Summary and hypotheses 
 Medication incidents remain widespread and may have a major impact on 
patient safety. They can also result in hospitalisations. This has much to do with the 
lack of openness, trust, fairness, speaking up and psychological safety, poor medical 
reporting and poor organisational learning - aspects which are viewed as parts of a 
blame culture. This study has examined if there is a relationship between two 
approaches to the problem of human fallibility and blame culture. The human error 
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problem can be addressed in two ways: the person approach and the system approach. 
Adherence to the person approach does not contribute to a safer health care. On the 
other hand, adherence to the system approach does contribute to ensuring a just 
culture, and can thereby improve patient safety. The results of the study may help to 
enhance patient safety in health care organisations concerning medication. Because 
the questionnaire was recently developed, the first hypothesis (hypothesis 1) focuses 
on the internal consistency of the Medication Safety Culture Questionnaire (MSCQ). 
Hypothesis 2 relates to the construct validity of the person/system scale when it is 
used in health care organisations. The other three hypotheses (hypothesis 3, 
hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5) regard the relationship between the person and system 
approaches and blame culture in health care organisations. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The various scales of the MSCQ are internally consistent.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The person/system scale is a constructually valid predictor of the two 
approaches of human fallibility in health care organisations.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants report viewing their organisational culture as unsafe 
(blame culture) when they experience the person approach.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Participants report viewing their organisational culture as safe (just 
culture) when they experience the system approach.  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant difference between scores on the various scales of 
the MSCQ for health care employees who experience the person approach and health 
care employees who experience the system approach.  
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2 Methods 
 
2.1 Procedure 
 The revised online MSCQ was filled in by 97 health care employees who 
prescribe, administer and/or monitor medication. The minimum age for participation 
was 18 years old. The participants were recruited through personal contacts and social 
media. Other participants received an e-mail containing information about the 
research and the link to the online survey. Participants filled in the questionnaire by 
either following a link in an e-mail (when acquired through personal networks) or 
following a link on social media (when acquired through Facebook, Twitter or 
LinkedIn). Data collection was completely anonymous; the names of participants 
were not requested and the link to the questionnaire was not linked to their e-mail 
addresses. It took approximately 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The 
questions appeared in random order. Five €20 bol.com gift vouchers were raffled to 
randomly chosen participants who filled in their e-mail address after completing the 
survey. The data was explored from Qualtrics to the statistical analysis programmes 
SPSS (IBM Corp, Armonk, NY) and R (R Core Team).  
 
2.2 Instruments 
 The quantitative data was collected by administering the MSCQ. This 
questionnaire was constructed based on the previously developed Blame/Just Culture 
Questionnaire and literature research on blame culture, human error and medication 
incidents registration. The questionnaire was developed for use in health care 
organisations where medication is prescribed, administered and/or monitored. The 
questionnaire contains 65 questions concerning blame culture, human error and 
medication incidents registration (Appendix 1). Various aspects of blame culture are 
addressed: management, fairness, fear/trust, openness, reporting, the person and 
system approaches, speaking up, psychological safety and organisational learning. 
These are discussed below. The questionnaire also includes questions about the CMR 
system. These questions were added because of additional research, and therefore are 
not taken into account in developing the blame culture/just culture questionnaire, 
which can be used in all health care organisations. Additionally, the questionnaire has 
one overriding question that measures the extent to which the participants perceive 
the culture in their departments as safe. All questions were combined in one online 
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survey made in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Qualtrics is online software that 
enables researchers to create surveys, send surveys with a specific link to participants 
and collect responses.  
 Management contains the management style within the team/department. 
Low scores on this scale are associated with a strong hierarchy, strict procedures, and 
close supervision by superiors.  
 Reporting contains the extent to which the culture within the team/department 
stimulates the reporting of medication incidents.  
 Openness contains the extent to which information is shared within the 
team/department when an incident occurs, and the extent to which incidents are 
discussed openly. 
Speaking up contains the extent to which people within the team/department 
are stimulated to make suggestions for improving the existing system.  
 Fairness contains the extent to which people within the team/department are 
treated fairly. 
 Fear/trust contains the extent to which people within the team/department 
support each other in their work, and the extent to which people are scared to make 
mistakes. 
 Person/system contains the extent to which people within the 
team/department are focusing on the unsafe acts of the people concerned instead of 
looking for the cause in the defensibility of the system.  
 Psychological safety contains the extent to which the team/department is 
committed to improve patient safety. 
 Learning contains the extent to which previous incidents are analysed and 
improvements are implemented within the team/department.  
 
2.3 Statistical analyses   
 The hypotheses were tested with the statistical analysis programmes SPSS and 
R. The variables were treated as interval variables, since the scales used in the 
questionnaire were based on a five-point Likert scale (Field, 2013). To test the first 
hypothesis, a reliability analysis was executed. Based on this analysis, the MSCQ 
was adjusted. The most frequently used internal consistency measure is Cronbach’s 
α. Internal consistency measures the consistency of results across items within a test. 
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The various scales of the questionnaire are internally consistent when α is greater than 
.70 (Field, 2013). Items that weighed the Cronbach’s α down were moved to another 
scale when possible, or otherwise removed from the analysis. If an item that weighed 
the Cronbach’s α down did not load high on another scale, it was removed from the 
analysis. Items were removed when Cronbach’s α was less than .50.  
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted to test whether the 
latent variable behind the items in the questionnaire was indeed blame culture. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that the person/system scale is a constructually valid predictor of 
the person and system approaches and, to test this assumption, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was executed by the statistical analysis program R. Confirmatory 
factor analysis tests whether the data fits the hypothesised measurement model 
(Figure 4). The hypothesised model is based on extensive literature research 
(Williams et al., 2010). The model assumes that person/system approach is the 
underlying construct behind the items in the person/system scale. By means of the 
chi-square test and absolute fits indices, it was determined how well the model fit to 
the data. The chi-squared test indicates the difference between observed and expected 
covariance matrices. Values closer to zero indicate a better fit. A comparative fit 
index (CFI) value of 0.95 or higher, and a goodness of fit index (GFI) value of over 
0.90 is considered as an indicator of good fit. A root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) value of 0.10 or less indicates a good fit (Brown, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4. Hypothesized first-order CFA model of blame culture 
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A simple regression analysis was executed to measure whether the person 
approach and system approach were related to blame culture/just culture (hypotheses 
3 and 4). The dependent variable was blame culture/just culture and the independent 
variable was person approach/system approach. The analysis was executed on the 
means of the items contributing to each scale. The R2 reflects how much variance of 
blame culture (Y) is explained by person/system approach (X). The ANOVA showed 
whether the model was significant by calculating the F value. If the model was 
significant with p less than .05, the null hypothesis could be rejected. If X had a p 
value greater than .05, this variable was likely to be a bad predictor of blame culture.  
To test the fifth hypothesis, the participants were divided into two independent 
groups depending on whether they experience the person approach or the system 
approach. An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare the means of 
these two unrelated groups on the scales of the MSCQ. The independent sample t-test 
requires that the dependent variable is approximately normally distributed within each 
group. Some deviation away from normality does not have a large influence on Type 
1 error rates, except when the ratio of the smallest to largest group size is greater than 
1.5 (largest compared to smallest). The independent t-test assumes the variances of 
the two groups are equal in the population. The Levene’s F test of equality of 
variances provides an F-statistic and a significance value (p-value). If the p-value is 
greater than 0.05, the group variances can be treated as equal (Field, 2013).   
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3 Results 
 
3.1 Participants 
 The questionnaire was completed by 97 health care employees throughout the 
Netherlands. Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of the participants. 
The male/female division was 16/84%. This seems logical, given that it was mostly 
women working in the care sector. The participants were employed at a variety of 
institutions in the health care sector: pharmacies, hospitals, care centres, nursing 
homes, home care and drugstores. Only health care employees who prescribe, 
administer and/or monitor medication could participate, as the questionnaire also 
consisted of questions about the CMR. The educational backgrounds of participants 
ranged from medicine, nursing and doctor’s assistance to pharmacy and 
pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the participants  
 Males  
(n = 16) 
  Females 
(n = 81) 
  
 M SD Range M SD Range 
Age 41.69 14.56 23-64 42.20 40.03 18-37 
Healthcare (y) 17.94 12.69 1-38 15.74 11.60 1-45 
Position (y) 13.56 12.07 1-35 9.30 9.06 0-36 
 
 
3.2 Reliability MSCQ and principal component analysis  
 The MSCQ had a Cronbach’s α of .869, which means that the reliability is 
considered good. Table 2 provides the Cronbach’s α for the total questionnaire and 
the different scales. The Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted indicates that the removal of 
items could increase the reliability. The number of participants remained the same 
(97).  
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Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha MSCQ 
 n α α if item deleted 
Total questionnaire 97 .885  
Management 97 .167 .660 (Q25 and Q28) 
Reporting 97 .566 .669 (Q33) 
Openness 97 .809  
Speaking up 97 .608 .706 (Q42) 
Fairness 97 .790  
Fear/trust 97 .766 .827 (Q55) 
Person/system 97 .767 .800 (Q59 and Q60) 
Safety 97 .728 .763 (Q70) 
Learning 97 .847  
 
 A principal component analysis was conducted to check whether blame 
culture is the underlying construct behind the items in the questionnaire. The sample 
size was considered too small to perform a factor analysis (N = 97). However, the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was .758, which indicates that the sampling is 
meritorious, and that it is worth doing a principal component analysis despite the 
small sample size. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (x2 = 3464,444; df = 
1431, p < .001). For factor analysis to be recommended suitable, the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity must be less than .05. The unrotated solution was used, which showed 
fifteen components with an eigenvalue higher than one. Based on the scree plot, the 
solution could have only one component (Figure 5). The first component included 
many items of all various scales. It is striking that the principal component had a very 
large eigenvalue, which means that that component explains most of the variance.  
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Figure 5. Scree plot of the principal component analysis of the blame culture 
questionnaire.  
 
 Based on the reliability analysis and principal component analysis, the scales 
of the questionnaire were adjusted. Items that did not fit with the current scales were 
checked on content and fit with items from another scale. Only one item was moved 
to another scale, as noted in Table 3. The items Q25, Q28, Q33, Q42, Q55, Q59 and 
Q60 were deleted from the questionnaire, as these items did not seem to fit to any of 
the scales according to the reliability analysis and principal component analysis. The 
item Q70 was moved to the management scale. This item is about what can be done to 
improve patient safety. This makes sense, as major changes often come from the 
management side rather than from the employees. The Cronbach’s alpha remained the 
same for openness (α = .809), fairness (α = .790) and learning (α = 847), and was 
improved for the other scales. This also applies to the total questionnaire (α = .905).  
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Table 3. Cronbach’s alpha of the final version of the MSCQ 
 α Items deleted Items added 
Total questionnaire .905   
Management .694 Q25 and Q28 Q70 
Reporting .669 Q33  
Openness .809   
Speaking up .706 Q42  
Fairness .790   
Fear/trust .827 Q55  
Person/system .800 Q59 and Q60  
Safety .763 Q70  
Learning .847   
 
 Table 4 presents the final descriptive statistics of the questionnaire. Without 
the questions about the CMR and after removal of items based on the results of the 
reliability analysis 38 items remain. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were significant 
for the total questionnaire and its scales. Therefore, it was assumed that the population 
is not normally distributed. This is in line with the skewness and kurtosis of the 
various scales.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the MSCQ  
 α items n M SD Sk Kurtosis KST 
Total questionnaire .905 38 97 2.111 .611 .470 -.628 .105* 
Management .694 4 97 2.487 .730 .665 .164 .166*** 
Reporting .669 4 97 2.255 .901 .558 -.319 .121** 
Openness .809 4 97 2.134 .907 .404 -.875 .139*** 
Speaking up .706 3 97 2.560 .893 -.164 -.595 .111** 
Fairness .790 3 97 1.735 .812 1.217 .818 .241*** 
Fear/trust .827 5 97 1.950 .798 1.076 .461 .196*** 
Person/system .800 8 97 2.278 .712 .802 .628 .094* 
Safety .763 3 97 1.619 .674 1.044 .757 .213*** 
Learning .847 4 97 1.992 .823 .654 -.260 .117** 
*p = < .05, ** p = < .01, *** p = .001 
		
25	
 
3.3 Confirmatory factor analysis MSCQ 
 To test whether the data fit the hypothesised model, a CFA was executed. The 
assumption of a CFA that a sufficient sample size should be greater than N = 200 was 
violated. The adjusted model was used, which was based on the adaptations that 
resulted from the reliability analysis (Table 3). The fit indices indicate that the 
adjusted model does not have a good fit to the data. The chi-square test was 
significant (x2 = 1113.480; df = 629, p < .001) and the CFI, NNFI and RMSEA 
respectively had values of .758, .730 and .089. Only the RMSEA was on the verge of 
a sufficient fit. Another confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test whether 
person/system approach is the latent variable behind the questions in the 
person/system scale (Hypothesis 2). The chi-square test was significant (x2 = 35.194; 
df = 14, p < .05). CFI was .886, NNFI was .830 and RMSEA was .125. Again, this 
points to a poor-fitting model. All items theoretically connected with the 
person/system scale loaded above .40. According to Hatcher (1994), factor loadings 
above .40 are meaningful, so this means that the items belong to this scale.  
 
3.4 Relationship person/system approach and blame culture 
 To determine the relationship between the score on the person/system scale 
and the score on the blame culture questionnaire (management, reporting, openness, 
speaking up, fairness, fair/trust, psychological safety and learning), a simple 
regression analysis was executed using the enter method. All assumptions of simple 
linear regression were met. The model was linear and exhibited homoscedasticity. 
Errors were independent and normally distributed. The Durbin-Watson value was 
2.183. None of the participants were excluded (N = 97). Person/system approach 
correlates positively with blame culture (r =.741, p = < .001). The ANOVA was 
significant (F = 115,74; df = 1.95, p = < .001). This meant that the score on the 
person/system scale was a significant, positive predictor of the score on the blame 
culture questionnaire. R2 was .549, indicating that 54.9% of the variance in the score 
on the blame culture questionnaire could be predicted from the score on the 
person/system scale.  
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3.5 Comparing the person and system approach groups 
 To compare the means of participants who experienced the person approach 
(N = 18) and participants who experienced the system approach (N = 79), the cases 
are divided into two groups based on the cut point. For the given cut point 3 (the 
middle option on the 1 to 5 scale), the new categories are group 1 (> 3) and group 2 (< 
3). First, the assumptions of the independent sample t-test were checked. Levene’s 
test of homogeneity of variances was not significant for the scales, except for 
fear/trust. This meant that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was in most of 
the cases not violated. Violation of the assumption was corrected by using the Welch-
Satterthwaite method. The plot below is a check on normality; the plotted points 
should follow the straight line. Serious departures would suggest that normality 
assumption is not met. But there is no major cause for concern (Figure 6). After 
checking the assumptions, an independent sample t-test was executed. The 
participants were excluded analysis by analysis. The results of the independent 
sample t-test are presented in Table 5.  
 
 
Figure 6. Normal P-P plot of the total mean score on the blame culture questionnaire 
and the person/system scale. 
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Table 5. Independent sample t-test  
 Person approach System approach  
 M SD M SD t-test 
Total questionnaire 2,89 .41 2.10 .48 6.84 
Management 2.98 .53 2.63 .44 2.92 
Reporting 2.58 .67 2.33 .77 1.27 
Openness 2.81 .76 1.98 .87 3.70 
Speaking up 3.14 .60 2.39 .74 4.04 
Fairness 2.63 .77 1.52 .68 6.12 
Fear/trust 2.94 .82 2.07 .58 4.29** 
Safety 2.68 .67 1.97 .61 4.37 
Learning 2.78 .83 1.81 .71 5.02 
*p = < .05, ** p = < .01, *** p = .001 
 
There was no significant difference between the person approach group and the 
system approach group on the total questionnaire. Only the score on fear/trust differed 
significantly between the two groups. The person approach group had a higher mean 
on the fear/trust scale (Mpa = 2.94, SDpa = .82 and Msa = 2.07, SDsa = .58). The 
results of the t-test are inconsistent with the results of the regression analysis. This is 
explained in the next section.  
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4 Discussion  
 
4.1 Discussion 
 This research has tested the reliability and construct validity of the recently 
adjusted blame culture questionnaire in health care organisations. It has also 
examined whether there is a relationship between the person and system approaches 
and blame culture. The first hypothesis stated that the various scales of the MSCQ are 
internally consistent. The results did support this hypothesis, since the reliability of 
the total questionnaire was considered good. Therefore, the total questionnaire seems 
to measure the same concept, but it did not capture every aspect of blame culture. The 
questionnaire was based on the most recent literature on blame culture, human error 
and medication incidents registration, but it is likely that the current research does not 
completely identify the complete definition of a blame culture. It is clear, however, 
that blame culture consists of several aspects, including management, reporting, 
fear/trust, openness, speaking up, fairness, person/system, psychological safety and 
learning. The reliability of the openness, fairness, person/system and learning scales 
were considered high. The Cronbach’s alpha for the rest of the scales was around .60 
and .70 out of 100, which can be considered sufficient.  
The second hypothesis assumed that the person/system scale is a valid 
predictor of the two approaches of human fallibility in health care organisations. This 
was tested with a confirmatory factor analysis. It revealed that the person/system scale 
is not a valid predictor of the person and system approaches. The fit indices of the 
CFA evidence that the hypothesised model does not have a sufficient fit to the data. 
This means that the person/system scale is still incomplete, but that on the basis of the 
factor loadings, no items on this scale should be removed. The total questionnaire is 
also not complete yet since the fit indices again indicated a poor model fit. There 
might be other aspects that were not mentioned in the literature that also play a role in 
blame culture, for example the interplay between team members. To date, only the 
influence of the manager on the team was taken into account. It is quite possible that 
the interplay between colleagues also plays a major role in determining the quality of 
the safety culture in their team/department.  
 The third and fourth hypotheses stated that the score on the person/system 
scale is related to the score on the MSCQ. The results support these hypotheses. 
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However, although a low score on the person/system scale (which indicates that there 
is a prevailing system approach) was strongly linked to a low score on the blame 
culture questionnaire, this does not necessarily mean that it is linked to a just culture, 
since it is not certain that a just culture is the opposite of a blame culture. Therefore, 
hypothesis four cannot be adopted yet. The score on the person/system scale is a 
significant predictor of the score on the blame culture questionnaire, since the 
person/system scale predicted 54.9% of the variance in the score on the blame culture 
questionnaire. This means that the person/system scale is a key predictor of blame 
culture, but there are also other related causal aspects. This accords with the research 
of Reason (2000), which mentions that the decoupling of a person’s unsafe acts from 
the responsibility of the organisation is in the interest of managers in most 
organisations with a prevailing person approach. This means that if there is an 
accident, a person or a group of people must have been responsible. Khatri et al. 
(2009) have stated that the unwillingness to accept responsibility for mistakes due to a 
fear of criticism or admonishment from management is the main characteristic of a 
blame culture. From both the literature and the results of this research, it becomes 
obvious that the person approach is strongly linked to blame culture.  
 Hypothesis 5 stated that participants who experienced the person approach and 
participants who experienced the system approach had a significantly different score 
on the various scales of the blame culture questionnaire. This is only confirmed for 
the fear/trust scale. The significant difference between the two groups on fear/trust is 
supported by the research of Gorini, Miglioretti and Pravettoni (2012). These authors 
state that a blame culture is not only caused by blaming each other, but may also be 
due to fear of being blamed. According to Reason (2000), the person approach is the 
most common method of error management among health care organisations. People 
are scared to make mistakes, as an individual or group of individuals is held 
responsible for unsafe acts. The two groups did not differ significantly from each 
other on the management scale. This may be because compliance with strict 
procedures within an organisation can be either negative or positive. The non-
significant difference for the speaking up scale can be explained by the fact that the 
extent to which people are stimulated to make suggestions for improvement is not 
only dependent on the extent to which they experience a blame culture, but also on 
individual personality. It is remarkable that the mean scores for the person approach 
were higher on all aspects than the mean scores for the system approach, implying 
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that there is a difference between the two groups. The reason why the groups did not 
differ significantly on most of the scales is probably because the group sizes differ 
greatly. As the person approach group was much smaller than the system approach 
group, the statistical power of the research was affected. 
 
4.2 Limitations and recommendations 
 For a correct interpretation of the research results, it is necessary to draw 
attention to the limitations of this research. Data were obtained by a self-reporting 
questionnaire. Because the questionnaire was filled in anonymously, it was therefore 
impossible to discourage socially desirable responses. Furthermore, the group of 
participants varied widely in position and number of years employed in the health 
sector. The downside of this is that participants within the sample still differ greatly 
from each other. It is remarkable that all participants have completed the 
questionnaire. This could be due to the length of the questionnaire. On average, it 
took the participants in the sample 20 minutes to fill in the questionnaire.   
 This study has revealed that the adjusted version of the questionnaire was still 
incomplete; there are likely other aspects of blame culture that need to be taken into 
account. Follow-up research should focus on those aspects with an uncertain relation 
to blame culture, e.g. the interplay between team members. The questionnaire should 
be further adjusted on the basis of the recommendations in this study and advance 
research in the area of blame culture. After all, the questionnaire should be tested 
again in the health care sector. Because the quality of the questionnaire is still 
relatively undetermined, the research results should be interpreted with care. Since it 
is also uncertain whether a just culture is the exact opposite of a blame culture, further 
work is therefore needed to research the link between blame culture and just culture. 
 Furthermore, the scores on the person/system scale were close to the cut point 
in many cases. This indicates that there was often a small difference between the two 
groups. Thus, it is difficult to compare them with each other. This perhaps also 
explains why there was only a significant difference between the two groups on the 
fear/trust scale. For instance, if only the “fully agree” (1-2) and “fully disagree” (4-5) 
responses are taken into account, it is expected that a significant difference between 
the groups will be found; at least on the score of the total questionnaire. But average 
responses are then excluded and neglected which reduces the total number of 
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participants. A larger sample size would have been preferable in this case. The sample 
size was particularly problematic in the performance of the CFA. Typical CFA 
models with several factors and indicators require a minimum sample of 200. In the 
case of a small sample size, major discrepancies are still not significant, and relatively 
poor models are therefore not quickly rejected. Larger samples produce larger chi-
squares that are significant even with very small discrepancies between the obtained 
and the implied covariance matrices (Wolf, Harrington, Clark & Miller, 2013). 
 Despite the fact that the person/system scale was not constructually valid, the 
results of the CFA were not extremely bad for such a small sample size. The 
regression analysis demonstrated that approximately 50% of the variance in score on 
the blame culture questionnaire is predicted by the person/system scale. This supports 
the conclusion that the person/system scale is a notable predictor of blame culture in 
the health care sector. So, it is worthwhile to undertake more research into the area of 
human error and the two methods of error management. This can contribute positively 
to the reliability and validity of the scale. It would then be possible to estimate with 
more certainty whether a person within a team/department experiences the person 
approach or the system approach. 
 
4.3 Conclusion  
 The safety culture in health care organisations has a major impact on the 
reporting of medication incidents, and accordingly influences patient safety. Despite 
the high reliability of the questionnaire, the model behind it is still incomplete. The 
current questionnaire includes important aspects of blame culture, but it does not 
identify the definition of a blame culture completely. It is imperative to continue 
searching for aspects that may influence blame culture. These can be used to further 
adjust the current version of the questionnaire, which enables health care 
organisations to examine whether there is a prevailing blame culture within the 
team/department. Obviously, a flaw must first be demonstrated before any 
improvements can be considered. A complete and valid questionnaire can therefore 
play a major role in improving patient safety.  
Based on data received from the current questionnaire, a significant, positive 
correlation was found between the person and system approaches and blame culture 
in health care organisations, and approximately half of the variance of blame culture 
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is explained by person/system approach, so it can be concluded that the person and 
system approaches are key predictors of blame culture. This accords with the 
hypotheses that participants reported viewing their organisational culture as unsafe 
(blame culture) when they experienced the person approach, and as safe (no-blame 
culture) when they experienced the system approach. Reason (2000) has confirmed 
this, and has further explained that cultural characteristics of high-reliability 
organisations could be imported into the health care sector. Further research should 
focus on the implications of this for the health care domain and determine which 
improvements can be made to achieve a just culture.   
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Appendix 1 Safety Medication Culture Questionnaire (MSCQ) 
 
Vragen over de CMR (Questions about the CMR)  
Sinds 2009 kunnen medicatie-incidenten worden gemeld bij de Centrale Medicatie-
incidenten Registratie (CMR). Het doel van de CMR is om medicatie-incidenten te 
voorkomen en daarmee de patiëntveiligheid te vergroten. De volgende vragen gaan 
over uw persoonlijke gebruik van de CMR, en dat van uw team of afdeling. 
  
Hoe vaak heeft u de afgelopen vijf jaar een incident gemeld bij het CMR? 
  
Wanneer u korter dan vijf jaar met medicatie werkzaam bent, vragen wij u uw 
gemiddelde per jaar te vermenigvuldigen met vijf. (Q10) 
 
Hoe vaak heeft u de afgelopen vijf jaar een medicatie-incident meegemaakt? (Q12) 
 
Hoeveel keer per jaar doet uw team of afdeling een melding bij de CMR? (Q14) 
 
Hoeveel keer per jaar doet een medicatie-incident zich voor binnen uw team of 
afdeling? (Q15) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt veel aandacht besteedt aan medewerkers 
bekendmaken met de CMR. (Q16) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling is voldoende kennis aanwezig om effectief gebruik te 
maken van de CMR. (Q18) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn alle medewerkers goed in staat om een medicatie-
incident te herkennen. (Q 19) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden 
medewerkers voldoende op de hoogte gesteld van waar en hoe zij dit kunnen 
melden. (Q20) 
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Als ik een medicatie-incident zou meemaken, weet ik niet goed hoe ik een melding 
moet maken bij de CMR. (Q21) 
 
Management 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling is er ruimte om kritiek te leveren op de ideeën van het 
management. (Q23) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn er strikte procedures en richtlijnen die bepalen hoe 
er gewerkt dient te worden. (Q25) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling is er sprake van een sterke hiërarchie. (Q26) 
 
De leidinggevenden van mijn afdeling/team handelen integer. (Q27) 
 
Mijn leidinggevende(n) zijn goed benaderbaar voor vragen, suggesties en/of zorgen. 
(Q24) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling houden leidinggevenden strikt toezicht op de uitvoering 
van werkzaamheden. (Q28) 
 
Rapporteren (Reporting) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden de meeste medicatie-incidenten gemeld. (Q29)
   
Mijn direct leidinggevende stimuleert me om medicatie-incidenten te melden. (Q31)
  
Medicatie-incidenten die zich binnen mijn team/op mijn afdeling voordoen, worden 
door de betrokkene(n) zelf gemeld. (Q32) 
 
Medicatie-incidenten die zich binnen mijn team/op mijn afdeling voordoen, worden 
door anderen gemeld. (Q33) 
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In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden veel medicatie-incidenten niet gerapporteerd. 
(Q34) 
 
Openheid (Openness) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden zorgverleners voldoende op de hoogte gesteld 
wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen. (Q36) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling blijven we geïnformeerd over de afhandeling van 
gemelde medicatie-incidenten. (Q38) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling nemen 
betrokkenen de verantwoordelijkheid op zich. (Q39) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medicatie-incidenten openlijk besproken. 
(Q40) 
 
Zich uitspreken (Speaking up) 
Ik doe regelmatig suggesties voor veranderingen om medicatie-incidenten te 
voorkomen. (Q42) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden weinig suggesties gedaan om medicatie-
incidenten te voorkomen. (Q44) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt het gestimuleerd om zorgen en/of suggesties 
over de uitvoering van werkzaamheden te delen. (Q45) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt weinig gedaan met suggesties om medicatie-
incidenten te voorkomen. (Q46) 
 
Eerlijkheid/rechtvaardigheid (Fairness) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden mensen die een medicatie-incident melden 
rechtvaardig behandeld. (Q47) 
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In mijn team/op mijn afdeling krijgen medewerkers regelmatig de schuld van 
andermans fouten. (Q48) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling gelden voor iedereen dezelfde regels. (Q49) 
 
Angst/vertrouwen (Fear/trust) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling heerst een vertrouwenssfeer. (Q50) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt goed samengewerkt. (Q51) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling mogen fouten gemaakt worden. (Q52) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medicatie-incidenten niet gemeld uit angst voor 
eventuele negatieve gevolgen (Q53).  
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling ondersteunt men elkaar in het uitvoeren van de 
werkzaamheden. (Q54) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden erg hoge verwachtingen gesteld. (Q55) 
 
Person/system 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt ervan uitgegaan dat mensen feilbaar zijn en dat 
er fouten gemaakt kunnen worden.  (Q56) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling word ik en/of mijn collega’s vaak beschuldigd van 
dingen zoals onoplettendheid, vergeetachtigheid en roekeloosheid. (Q57) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt de 
oorzaak gezocht in fouten in de procedures/beschermingsmaatregelen. (Q58) 
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Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden 
de werkomstandigheden sterk aangescherpt. (Q59) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt de 
oorzaak gezocht in fouten van en/of overtredingen door medewerkers. (Q60) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden 
de volgende maatregelen genomen: campagnes die angstgevoelens oproepen, 
disciplinaire maatregelen, omscholing, de schuld geven en/of dreigen met een 
rechtszaak. (Q61) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt er 
eerder gekeken naar waarom de procedures hebben gefaald dan naar wie er een steek 
heeft laten vallen. (Q62) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden beschermingsmaatregelen genomen om het 
risico te verkleinen dat vergissingen, onoplettendheid en/of overtredingen van 
medewerkers tot medicatie-incidenten leiden. (Q63) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten optreden in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt ervan uit 
gegaan dat iemand van het personeel verantwoordelijk is. (Q64) 
 
Veiligheid (Psychological safety) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling staat patiëntveiligheid hoog in het vaandel. (Q65) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt veel gedaan om de patiëntveiligheid te 
verbeteren. (Q67) 
 
Wanneer medewerkers in mijn team/op mijn afdeling hun werkzaamheden uitvoeren 
op een manier die ten koste gaat van de patiëntveiligheid worden zij hierop 
aangesproken. (Q69) 
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In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zou meer gedaan kunnen worden om de 
patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren. (Q70) 
 
Leren (Learning) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn we actief bezig om medicatie-incidenten te 
voorkomen. (Q71) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medicatie-incidenten besproken om te 
voorkomen dat ze in de toekomst weer gebeuren. (Q72) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling hebben de evaluaties van eerdere medicatie-incidenten 
tot positieve veranderingen geleid. (Q73) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt 
vaak oplossingsgericht gedacht. (Q77) 
 
 
 
